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EVIDENCE-At-Issue Waiver of Attorney-Client
Privilege and Public Service Co. of New Mexico v. Lyons: A
Party Must Use Privileged Materials Offensively in
Order to Waive the Privilege
I. INTRODUCTION
In Public Service Co. of New Mexico v. Lyons,' the New Mexico Court of
Appeals held that, to waive attorney-client privilege under the at-issue waiver
doctrine, 2 a party must make offensive or direct use of the privileged materials.'
New Mexico courts had not previously decided how to approach waiver when a
party places privileged matters at issue in litigation.4 In choosing the most restrictive
waiver approach, 5 the Lyons court underscored New Mexico's distinctive approach
to privileges 6 and emphasized the policy behind attorney-client privilege. This Note
recounts the general development of privilege doctrine, discusses the unique nature
of judicial rulemaking in New Mexico, examines the Lyons court's rationale, and
explores the implications of the court's decision.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-appellant Public Service Co. of New Mexico (PNM), a public utility, is
a part-owner of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in Arizona. PNM
created a trust, with plaintiff-appellant Mellon Bank as trustee, as part of a plan to
generate $500 million toward the future cost of decommissioning the plant.9 The

1. 129 N.M. 487, 10 P.3d 166 (Ct. App. 2000).
2. The Lyons court adopted the following definition of "at-issue waiver" (also called "implied waiver,"
"offensive-use waiver," "issue-injection waiver," and "affirmative-use waiver"): "A person who places privileged
matters 'at-issue' in the litigation can be said to have implicitly consented to disclosure." Id. at 492, 10 P.3d at 17 1.
3. Id. at 494-95, 10 P.3d at 173-74. Judge Apodaca wrote for the court, and Judges Bosson and Armijo
concurred.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id. at491, 10 P.3d at 170.
7. Id. at 495, 10 P.3d at 174.
8. Id. at 489, 10 P.3d at 168. PNM and six other utilities built Palo Verde in the 1970s and 1980s, with
construction completed in 1988. Dennis Domrzalski, Payingfor Palo Verde, ALBUQUERQUETRIB., Aug. 27, 1997,
at DI. The utilities borrowed money for the construction, in effect taking out mortgages on the plant. Id. The plant
was intended to serve the utilities' power needs and to sell power across the West. Dan Vukelich, Company Pushes
to Open PNM's Lines, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Oct. 15, 1998, at BI. But almost as soon as Palo Verde was
operational, the utilities discovered that market conditions had changed and that the West was flooded with cheap
hydroelectric power from the Pacific Northwest. Id. "Suddenly, Palo Verde was unable to pay for itself and became
a drag on PNM's profit picture." Id. PNM customers' bills already include charges for the investment in Palo Verde.
Thorn McGhee, PNM Hands Regulators a Big Bill, ALBUQUERQUE J., June 1, 2000, at Al. When New Mexico
deregulates its electricity market, PNM wants state regulators to let it collect from ratepayers $700 million in
"stranded" costs-the value of investments PNM does not expect to recoup in a deregulated, competitive market.
See id. (Originally set to begin in 2002, deregulation is currently set to start in 2007. Rosalie Rayburn, Electric
DeregulationDelayed5 Years, ALBUQUERQUE J., March 9, 2001, at B4.) Most of the stranded costs are associated
with the company's investment in Palo Verde. McGhee, supra. In addition, the plant has a set lifetime, and PNM
must help pay to decommission the plant when that time expires and return the plant site to its original condition.
See id. Customer bills already include decommissioning charges, and PNM has asked regulators to let it collect
more decommissioning costs from customers. Id. The investment plan that led to the case about which this Note
is written was an additional means of raising money for decommissioning Palo Verde.
9. SeeLyonsat 489, 10P.3dat 168.
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trust was invested in a corporate-owned life insurance program,' and in 1987 and
1988, the trust bought 1729 life insurance policies." The plaintiffs said they
discovered in 1997 that their investment would not perform to expectations, and in
1998 they sued the insurance, accounting, and financial-planning firms involved in
setting up and monitoring the investment.' The complaint alleged numerous
3
theories of recovery, including fraud.' In their answer, the defendants raised
expiration of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. In return, the
4
plaintiffs alleged equitable tolling based on prior ignorance of the basis of the
5
claims.'
The defendants moved to compel production of documents relevant to the
plaintiffs' assertion that they did not discover the alleged improper conduct until
1997.16 The defendants said a plaintiff who claims equitable tolling puts at issue, and
thus waives protection for, communications that may shed light on whether the
7
plaintiff is telling the truth about prior ignorance. The trial court granted the
defendants' motion and characterized any documents pertaining to the plaintiffs's
knowledge as relevant and vital to the disposition of the equitable tolling issue.'
The trial court appointed a special master to review the documents listed on the
plaintiffs' privilege log and to tell the court what-documents satisfied the court's
definition of relevance.' 9
The plaintiffs applied for interlocutory appeal from that order, and the appeals
court granted the application. 0 The trial court stayed any order requiring production

10. Id. Such program, known as COU programs, are designed to provide tax-free money to pay for
corporate obligations. Id. In this instance, the insurance companies invested a portion of the premiums in securities
that were supposed to generate the decommissioning costs. The rest of the premium paid for the policies and
benefits to employees. Tom McGhee, PNM Workers' Life Insurance Went to Palo Verde Cleanup, ALBUQUERQUE
J., Sept. 7, 2000, at Al.
i1. Lyons, 129 N.M. at489, 10 P.3d at 168.
12. See id. at 490, 10 P.3d at 169.
13. Id. Other counts included deceptive insurance practices, unfair trade practices, breach of contract, breach
of fiduciary duty, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel. Id. The defendants removed
the case to federal court, then moved to dismiss, alleging failure to plead fraud with particularity as required by
federal and state rules of civil procedure. The plaintiffs successfully moved to have the case sent back to state court.
There, the defendants renewed their motion to dismiss and lost. The defendants then answered the complaint.
14. Under the doctrine of equitable tolling, the statute of limitations will not bar a claim if the plaintiff,
despite diligent efforts, did not discover the injury until after the limitations period had expired. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 560 (7th ed. 1999). "Equitable tolling is invoked when the prospective plaintiff simply does not have
and cannot with due diligence obtain information essential to bringing a suit." Wolin v. Smith Barney, Inc., 83 F.3d
847, 852 (7th Cir. 1996).
15. See Lyons, 129 N.M. at 490, 10 P.3d'at 169.
16. Id.
17. Id
18. Id
19. Id
20. Id. Uncertain whether the underlying order was subject to the collateral-order doctrine, the plaintiffs also
petitioned for a writ of error. The collateral order doctrine allows appeal from an interlocutory order that
conclusively determines an important issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action and is
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See Johnson v. Jones, 51 U.S. 304, 310 (1995). New
Mexico applies the collateral order doctrine through writs of error issued pursuant to N.M. R. Civ. P. 12-503. See
Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 616, 845 P.2d 130, 139 (1992). The appeals court granted the writ in addition to
granting the application for interlocutory appeal and consolidated the appeals without resolving the appropriate
procedure for seeking appellate review of the trial court's order.
The appeals court further noted that, as a general matter, it reviews discovery orders for abuse of
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pending disposition of the interlocutory appeal. 2
In the appeal, the Lyons court held that a plaintiff waives attorney-client privilege
under the at-issue waiver doctrine only when he or she makes offensive or direct use
of the privileged materials.' The court did not apply this approach, but rather
remanded for the trial court to do so.23
Il. BACKGROUND
A. Privilegesand the General Duty to Testify
Privileges run counter to the maxim that the public has a right to everyone's
evidence. When considering privileges, "we start with the primary assumption that
there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any
exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional."' Exceptions to the general
duty may be justified by "a public good transcending the normally predominant
principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth."' Privileges so
justified include those between priest and penitent, physician and patient, and
attorney and client.27
B. The History and Value of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of all evidentiary privileges, having
been recognized in English cases as early as 1577.' Historically, the privilege was
viewed as protecting the bond of trust between attorney and client and upholding the
honor of the lawyer.29 To compel disclosure of client secrets would force an act of
betrayal. 30 Without the privilege, lawyers might warn clients that the law provided
no protection for what they were
about to say, and lawyers would thus be cast as
3
adversaries to their own clients. '
While these ideals behind the privilege remain valid, the modern rationale is more
utilitarian. 32 "The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyers being fully
discretion. Lyons, 129 N.M. at 490, 10 P.3d at 169 (citing Hartman v. Texaco, 123 N.M. 220, 225, 937 P.2d 979,

983 (Ct. App. 1997)). Inthe PNM appeal, however, the issue required review of the trial
court's construction of law
regarding privileges, and as such presented a legal question that the appeals court reviewed de novo. Id at 490-91,
10 P.3d at 169-70 (citing N.M. Right to ChooseINARAL v. Johnson, 127 N.M. 654,656,986 P.2d 450,452(1999)).
21. Lyons, 129 N.M. at490, 10 P.3d at 169. After the appeals court docketed the appeal the special master
provided the trial
court with a list of documents believed to satisfy the court's criteria for production. Id
22. l at 494, 10 P.3d at 173.
23. Id. at 497, 10 P.3d at 176. The defendants then petitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court for writs of
certiorari. The parties settled while the petitions were pending, see McGhee, supra note 10, and the petitions for
certiorari were dismissed, 39 N.M.B. Bull. 37 at 9 (Sept. 14, 2000).
24. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
25. Id.
26. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234

(1960)).
27. Id.
28. 2 CtusToPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 181 (2d ed. 1994) (citing

Berd v. Lovelace, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (1577)).
29.

MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 28.

30. Id.
31. Id
32. Id.
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informed by the client."33 The New Mexico Supreme Court has recognized that the
"whole purpose" of the attorney-client privilege "is to facilitate full and free
34
and proper defense.
disclosure to one's counsel in order to insure adequate advice
Without the privilege, therefore, attorneys might lack the information necessary to
provide effective legal representation.3 5 Clients might be deterred from seeking legal
assistance in the first place, or at least might be deterred from speaking candidly
about facts relevant to the case.36
criticize the
The attorney-client privilege is not without negatives. Detractors
37 It certainly comes
privilege as an obstacle to truth and even a shelter for the guilty.
at a cost to the truth-finding process. 31 Still, the trade-off has typically been deemed
worthwhile. "The social good derived from the proper performance of the functions
of lawyers acting for their clients is believed to outweigh the harm that may come
from the suppression of the evidence in specific cases."
C. New Mexico's Special Approach to Privileges
New Mexico has over the years seen a quest for balance between legislative and
4
judicial power in determining rules of procedure. A significant external influence
on New Mexico procedural law came in the 1920s with the work of Roscoe Pound,

33. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). The purpose of the privilege "is to encourage
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in
the observance of law and administration of justice." Id.
34. State v. Valdez, 95 N.M. 70, 73, 618 P.2d 1234, 1237 (1980).
35. MUELLER &KIRKPATRICK, supra note 28. The American Bar Association has incorporated this notion
into its Model Rules of Professional Conduct: "The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate
confidential information of the client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper
representation of the client but also encourages people to seek early legal assistance." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt (1983).
36. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 28.
37. Id. Jeremy Bentham argued that attorney-client privilege protects only the guilty. See 5 JEREMY
BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 301-04 (John Stuart Mill ed., Hunt & Clarke 1827). Bentham

reasoned that disclosure of communications by an innocent client would not be damaging, and that disclosure by
guilty clients would mean only "[t]hat a guilty person will not in general be able to derive quite so much assistance
from his law adviser, in the way of concerting a false defense, as he may do at present." Id. Bentham's argument
ignores the possibility of innocent clients who are victims of incriminating circumstances that they would not want
disclosed. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 28.
Certain well-settled exceptions to the attorney-client privilege may address objections to the attorney'crime-fraud' exception holds that clients are
client privilege without undermining its value. For example, "[t]he
not entitled to the privilege to protect communications made in contemplation or furtherance of a crime or fraud."
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 503.30 (Joseph M. McLaughlin,
ed., LEXIS Publishing, 2d ed. 2000) (1975). Exceptions are also recognized for communications relevant to a
breach of duty by the attorney to the client and for communications relevant to attested documents to which the
attorney is an attesting witness. Id. Exceptions may also be recognized for certain communications by a deceased
client and for communications relevant to matters of common interest between joint clients. Id.
38. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 28.
39. United States v.United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) (quoting from MODEL
EVID. CODE § 210 cmt. a. (Proposed Final Draft 1942)). "(T]he loss of evidence admittedly caused by the privilege
is justified in part by the fact that without the privilege, the client may not have made such communications in the
first place." Swidler & Berlin v.United States. 524 U.S. 399, 408 (1998). "As a practical matter, if the client knows
that damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself
in the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain
fully informed legal advice." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,403 (1976).
40. Michael B. Browde & Mario E. Occhialino, Separation ofPowers and the Judicial Rule-Making Power
in New Mexico: The Need for PrudentialConstraints, 15 N.M. L REv. 407, 411 (1985).
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the American jurist and educator whose articles urged that the judiciary take a
dominant role in procedural rule-making. 41 Before Pound, most jurisdictions,
including New Mexico, operated under the assumption that the legislature had

authority over procedure and that courts acted "only interstitially" at the invitation
of legislatures to fill in the details." In 1933, the New Mexico Legislature adopted

a statute that embodied Pound's views. 43 The statute explicitly authorized the New

Mexico Supreme Court to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure."
The motivation was convenience and efficiency, "rather than a perception that
constitutional doctrines were implicated."' 5
The doctrine of exclusive judicial rule-making power as rooted in constitutional
separation of powers was developed" in the mid-1970s in State ex rel. Anaya v.
McBride 7 and Ammerman v. HubbardBroadcasting.8 McBride held that under the
New Mexico Constitution the legislature lacks power to prescribe by statute rules
of evidence and procedure. 4'9 Ammerman held that, because rule-making power was
conferred exclusively on the judiciary by the New Mexico Constitution and Rule
501 of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence,5 a journalist privilege created by statute
was invalid.5'
Despite the holdings in McBride and Ammerman that procedural rule-making is
an exclusive function of the judiciary, later decisions vacillated between that view
and a view of shared legislative and judicial power. 2 A pattern emerged preserving
the exclusive-judicial-function rationale in two categories of cases: those involving
statutes that purport to regulate "essential functions" of the judiciary and those
involving testimonial privileges.53
The supreme court has since reaffirmed its declaration that only the court through
54
its rule-making power has the authority to create testimonial privileges. In State

at 421.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 425.
44. Browde & Occhialino, supra note 40, at 426 (citing Act of Mar. i3,1933, ch. 84,1933 N.M. Laws 148).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 88 N.M. 244,539 P.2d 1006 (1975).
48. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976).
49. Anaya, 88 N.M. at 246, 539 P.2d at 1008 ("Our constitutional power under N.M. Const. art. Ill § I and
art. VI § 3 of superintending control over all inferior courts carries with it the inherent power to regulate
all.. .procedure affecting the judicial branch.... Under the Constitution, the legislature lacks the power to prescribe
by statute rules of practice and procedure.").
50. The rule states,
Except as otherwise required by Constitution, and except as provided in these rules or in other
rules adopted by the supreme court, no person has a privilege to: A. refuse to be a witness; or B.
refuse to disclose any matter; or C. refuse to produce any object or writing; or D. prevent another
from being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing any object or writing.
N.M.R. EVID. 11-501.
51. The court found that rules of evidence are, "by reason of the function they serve in the judicial
process ... very largely, if not entirely, procedural." Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 310, 551 P.2d at 1357. The court then
said the New Mexico Constitution vests in the New Mexico Supreme Court the exclusive power to promulgate rules
of procedure. See id. at 311, 551 P.2d at 1358 (citing, e.g.,Anaya, 88 N.M. at 246, 539 P.2d at 1008). The court later
promulgated a journalist privilege. See N.M. R. EVID. 11-514.
52. Browde & Occhialino, supra note 40,at 447.
53. Id.
54. id. at 455.
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ex rel. Attorney General v. First Judicial District Court,55 for example, the court
denied privileges puTortedly created by federal law and by common law
evidentiary principles. 5 The court did recognize an executive privilege inherent in
the separation of powers passage of the New Mexico Constitution."
While New Mexico permits only privileges inherent in the state or federal
constitutions or created by the court in the Rules of Evidence,58 federal courts have
a flexible standard.59 The federal rule requires courts to treat privileges on a case-bycase basis.' The standard "set[s] forth the means for evolution of federal privilege
law."'" In addition, "[tihe Supreme Court has made it clear that Rule 501 also
authorizes the federal courts to establish new privileges in response to changing
' In short, New Mexico takes a rigid approach to privileges: Neither the
conditions."62
legislature nor the common law can create them. Courts may recognize only those
inherent in the state or federal constitutions or stated in the Rules of Evidence.
D. Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Despite the perceived value of the attorney-client privilege, it is possible to waive
the privilege.63 Typically, the privilege is waived if the client voluntarily discloses
or consents to disclosure of the privileged communication.' The rationale behind

55. 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330(1981).
56. Id. at 261, 629 P.2d at 337.
57. The passage states,
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the
legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any powers
properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution otherwise expressly
directed or permitted.
N.M. CONST. al HI, § 1.

The court found that "[i]nherent in the successful functioning of an independent executive is the valid
need for protection of communications between its members." First Judicial,96 N.M. at 258, 629 P.2d at 334. The
court found the executive privilege not to be absolute, but rather a privilege to be balanced against other interests
protected by law. Id. Such a balancing approach would not later prove to apply to the attorney-client privilege in
Lyons.
58. Browde & Occhialino, supra note 40, at 457.
59. WEiNsTE1N & BERGER, supra note 37, § 501.01. The rule itself states,
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of
Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
60. WEiNSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 37, § 501.02.
61. Id.
62. Id. Rule 501 "did not freeze the law governing the privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular
point in our history, but rather directed federal courts to continue the evolutionary development of testimonial
privileges." Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. "Waiver follows from any conduct by the client that would make it unfair for him thereafter to assert
the privilege." 2 MICHAEtL M. MARTIN ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 717 (7th ed. 1998).
64. "A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of the confidential matter or
communication waives the privilege if the person or person's predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily
discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication." N.M. R. EVID. 11-511.
"In contrast to a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, where a litigant must knowingly
intend to give up the protection before a waiver will occur, the attorney-client privilege may be waived without the
client's knowledge or intent." Jennifer A. Hardgrove, Note, Scope of Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege:

Summer 2001]

EVIDENCE

the doctrine of waiver is that, if clients disclose privileged information to third
parties, they most likely would have disclosed it to their attorneys even without the
protection of the privilege.6" Therefore, one of the reasons for the privilege's
existence-to motivate clients to disclose essential facts to their attorneys-no
longer applies. 6
Clearly, explicit voluntary disclosure waives the privilege. For example, a
defendant may waive the privilege as to certain communications with his attorney
by suing the attorney for malpractice regarding those communications.6 7
1. At-issue Waiver
The client may also impliedly waive the privilege by acting in a manner
inconsistent with maintaining confidentiality.6 Here enters the doctrine of at-issue
waiver. Courts typically employ one of three general approaches to at-issue waiver.69
One is the "automatic waiver" rule, which provides that a litigant automatically
waives the privilege upon asserting a claim, counterclaim, or affirmative defense
that raises as an issue a matter to which otherwise privileged material is relevant."0
Another at-issue waiver approach traces its origins 7 to Hearn v. Rhay,' 2 in which
a federal district court created a three-part balancing test: The attorney-client
privilege is impliedly waived when
(1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act, such as filing
suit, by the asserting party; (2) through this affirmative act, the asserting party
put the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3)
have denied the opposing party access to
application of the privilege would
73
information vital to his defense.
A third approach provides "that a litigant waives the attorney-client privilege if,
and only if, the litigant directly puts the attorney's advice at issue in the litigation."74
The advice of counsel is placed at issue "where the client asserts a claim or defense,
and attempts to prove that claim or defense by disclosing or describing an attorneyclient communication.""
Articulating a StandardThat Will Afford Guidanceto Courts, 1998 U. ILL. L REV. 643. 651 (1998).
65. Hardgrove, supra note 64, at 652.
66. Id.
67. See Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cit. 1994).
68. Hardgrove, supra note 64, at 654.
69. Frontier Refining, Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 699 (10th Cir. 1998).
70. Id. (citing Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) as origin
of the "automatic waiver" rule).
71. Alan M. Klinger & James L Bernard, An Update to a Comprehensive Survey of the Attorney-Client
Privilegeand Work ProductDoctrineby the HonorableAlvin K. Hellerstein,U.S.D.J., S.D.N. Y., S.E. 99 AMERICAN
LAw INSTITrTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COURSE OF STUDY 191 (April 13,

2000).
72. 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
73. Id. at 581.
74. FrontierRefining, 136 F.3d at 699-700 (citing Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d
851, 863-64 (3d Cir. 1994)).
75. Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 863. In adopting this approach, the Rhone-Poulenc court minced no words
regarding its distaste for opinions applying the Hearn test:
While the opinions dress up their analysis with a checklist of factors, they appear to rest on a
conclusion that the information sought is relevant and should in fairness be disclosed. Relevance
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2. At-issue Waiver in New Mexico
a. Court of Appeals
Before Lyons, the New Mexico Court of Appeals had addressed at-issue waiver
in Skaggs v. Conoco, Inc.76 There, the plaintiffs contended the defendants had
waived the attorney-client privilege for certain documents by asserting affirmative
defenses, including laches, 77 that placed the contents of the documents at issue.78 The
Skaggs plaintiffs relied on Conkling v. Turner,79 a Fifth Circuit case. In Conkling,
the plaintiff sought to evade application of the statute of limitations but refused to
let his attorneys be deposed concerning when he knew or should have known of
facts giving rise to his claim.' The Conkling court relied on the Hearn8' test in
finding waiver. 2
The New Mexico court in Skaggs did not find waiver, but it was not clear whether
the court used Conkling and Hearn for guidance. On the one hand, it stated that "a
party does not waive a claim of attorney-client privilege simply because he or she
has asserted an affirmative defense; rather there must be some 'offensive use' of the
privileged information for waiver to occur. ' 83 Yet the Skaggs court then quoted
Conkling and found no waiver "under the facts presented here," 4 perhaps indicating
it was using the Hearn,fact-intensive balancing test. The court continued: "[W]e fail
to see how, the defense of laches implicates the title opinions sought by Plaintiffs
since Defendants have not been shown to have relied upon those opinions to prove
their defense of laches." 85 There, perhaps, the Skaggs court indicated it was indeed
requiring an "offensive use" as previously stated. The Skaggs court concluded by
is not the standard for determining whether or not evidence should be protected from disclosure
as privileged, and that remains the case even if one might conclude the facts to be disclosed are
vital, highly probative, directly relevant or even go to the heart of an issue.
As the attorney client privilege is intended to assure a client that he or she can consult with
counsel in confidence, finding that confidentiality may be waived depending on the relevance
of the communication completely undermines the interest to be served. Clients will face the
greatest risk of disclosure for what may be the most important matters. Furthermore, because the
definition of what may be relevant and discoverable from those consultations may depend on the
facts and circumstances of as yet unfiled litigation, the client will have no sense of whether the
communication may be relevant to some future issue, and will have no sense of certainty or
assurance that the communication will remain confidential.
Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 864.
76. 125 N.M. 97,957 P.2d 526 (1998).
77. Laches is an "equitable doctrine by which a court denies refief to a claimant who has unreasonably
delayed or been negligent in asserting the claim, when that delay or negligence has prejudiced the party against
whom relief is sought." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 879 (7th ed. 1999). With laches, a party that behaves "more like
Rip Van Winkle than 'the early bird'... must live with the consequences." Lake Caryonah Improvement Ass'n v.
Pulte Home Corp., 903 F.2d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1990).
78. See Skaggs, 125 N.M. at 102, 957 P.2d at 531.
79. 883 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1989).
80. See id. at 433-34.
81. Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
82. See Conkling, 883 F.2d at 434.
83. Skaggs, 125 N.M. at 102, 957 P.2d at 531 (citing Marathon Oil Co. v. Moye, 893 S.W.2d 585, 590-92
(Tex. App. 1994)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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favorably citing an early comment to the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers:
Whether an adversary may obtain discovery of materials that otherwise are
privileged depends not merely upon what the client pleads but upon the way in
which the client will likely prove the assertion. If, for example, the client
proposes to prove the allegation [or defense] in ways that do not involve any
privileged communication, the exception does not apply."
In other words, the Skaggs court left open the question of how directly one must use
privileged information in order to waive the privilege.
b. Supreme Court
Nor has the state's top court directly stated a standard for at-issue waiver of the
attorney-client privilege. In Hartmanv. El PasoNaturalGas Co.,8 7 the New Mexico
Supreme Court found waiver of the attorney-client privilege, but because the
defendant had inadvertently produced allegedly protected documents, not because
of any affirmative defenses the defendant had put forth.88 The court did find that
"[t]he modem trend seems to be towards a case by case determination of waiver
based on a consideration of all circumstances."89 Again, however, the court appeared
to be speaking not of waiver in general or of at-issue waiver, but only of waiver
through inadvertent disclosure. "The 'inadvertence' of the production is considered
as one factor in determining whether there has been a waiver,"''9 the court wrote. In
short, previous New Mexico court rulings left unresolved the standard for at-issue
waiver of attorney-client privilege.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LYONS COURT'S RATIONALE
A. How the Court Reached Its Holding
In Lyons, the court of appeals examined New Mexico's special approach to
privileges.9' First, the court noted that only the judiciary, and not the legislature,

86. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 130 cmt. c., at 231 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1989)). The comment is not present in the most recent draft, Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996.
87. 107 N.M. 679, 763 P.2d 1144(1988).
88. Id. at 681, 763 P.2d at 1146.
89. Id. at 687, 763 P.2d at 1152 (quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 329 (N.D. Cal.
1985)).

90. Id. The Hartman court went on to examine the defendant's conduct according to factors relevant only
to inadvertent disclosure. Id.
Waiver through inadvertent disclosure is itself subject to several approaches. Under the "lenient"

approach, the attorney-client privilege exists for the benefit of the client and cannot be waived except by intentional
relinquishment. Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1483 (1996). In effect, mere inadvertent production does not waive
the privilege. Id. (citing Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991)).
Under the "middle-of-the-road" approach used in Hartman, the court performs a balancing test, taking into
consideration such factors as the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure and
whether justice would be served by relieving the party of its error. See Gray,86 F.3d at 1483-84. Under the "strict"
approach, any document produced, intentionally or otherwise, loses its privileged status with the possible exception
of situations in which all precautions were taken. Id. at 1483.
91. Lyons, 129 N.M. at491, 10P.3d at 170.
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may create privileges in New Mexico. 92 The court further noted that, while Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 authorizes lower federal courts to expand privileges, the
parallel New Mexico Rule of Evidence allows no such expansion.93 Thus, the court
found itself bound by the privilege rules expressly stated in the New Mexico Rules
of Evidence." In those rules, no stated exception to the attorney-client privilege
applied to the case at hand. 95 The court found, however, the rule allowing for waiver
96
of any kind of privilege through voluntary disclosure. The court determined that
9
such waiver was consistent with general principles of privilege waiver. Yet the
court was mindful that New Mexico is "rule-bound" concerning recognition of
privileges.9" The court thus concluded that it must not "engage in the type of ad hoc
judicial waiver analysis engaged in by other courts that are free to apply the
law.... Our courts must adhere closely to waiver as defined in Rule 11common
:511.''99
The Lyons court went on to examine the three general approaches to at-issue
waiver. lo0 The Lyons court found the automatic-waiver approach simple to apply but
02
noted it has been criticized as too rigid. 0 ' The court next considered the Hearn'
03
balancing test, which has been adopted by most jurisdictions. The Lyons court
found the Hearn test to be ostensibly fair yet ultimately unfair, partly because a test
the
of opponent "need" imposes no limits or certainty.'" The court also agreed with
5
Fifth Circuit's analysis in Rhone-PoulencRorer, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co.'° That
court argued that including relevance in the waiver analysis undermines the very
point of the privilege: frank attorney-client communication.106 The court viewed
favorably the Rhone-Poulenc approach, whereby a party waives attorney-client
privilege when the party "seeks to limit its liability by describing that advice and by
asserting that he relied on that advice."' 0 7 The Rhone-Poulenc approach also

92. Id. (citing Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354(1976)).
93. Lyons, 129 N.M. at 491, 10 P.3d at 170. New Mexico Rule of Evidence 11-501 omits the "common law"
language in the federal rule. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that this fact "manifests the abrogation and
Attorney Gen. v. First Judicial Dist. Court,
inapplicability of the common law evidentiary privileges." State ex rel.
96 N.M. 254, 260, 629 P.2d 330, 336 (1981).
94. See Lyons, 129 N.M. at 491. 10 P.3d at 170.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing N.M. R. EVID. 11-511).
97. Id.
98. See id
99. Id. at 491-92, 10 P.3d at 170-71.
100. See Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. Lyons, 129 N.M. 487, 492, 10 P.3d 166, 171 (Ct. App. 2000).
101. See id. ("This approach has been severely criticized as too rigid and has been adopted in only a handful
of cases.").

102. See Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574,581 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
103. See Lyons, 129 N.M. at 492-93, 10P.3dat 171-72.
104. See id. at 492, 10 P.3d at 172. Note that this contrasts with the balancing approach the New Mexico
Supreme Court used in State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330 (1981)
when applying the executive privilege. See supra note 57.
105. 32 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 1994).
106. Lyons, 129 N.M. at 494, 10 P.3d at 173 ("As the attorney client privilege is intended to assure a client
that he or she can consult with counsel in confidence, finding that confidentiality may be waived depending on the
relevance of the communication completely undermines the interest to be served.") (quoting Rhone-Poulenc, 32
F.3d at 864).
107. Id. (quoting Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 863).
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recognizes waiver where direct use is anticipated because the holder of the privilege
must use the materials at some point in order to prevail.'"a
In adopting the Rhone-Poulenc approach, the Lyons court stated that its ruling
dovetailed with New Mexico's rule-bound, rather than ad hoc, development of
privilege rules. 9 The Lyons court further said its ruling is consistent with the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege: "to encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in
the observance of law and administration of justice.""' This "venerable privilege,"
the court said, must not be placed in harm's way "even at the expense of a zealous
pursuit of truth."".
Finally, the court concluded that New Mexico case law supported its holding.tt 2
The court noted that, while both sides in the appeal relied on Skaggs v. Conoco,
Inc.,' the Skaggs court did not review at-issue waiver in great depth."' Despite the
Skaggs court's citation to Conkling' 5 and that opinion's reliance on Hearn,"' the
Lyons court inferred from the Skaggs decision a preference for the Rhone-Poulenc
approach." 7 The court noted that Hearn is a fact-intensive test and said Skaggs did
not suggest that the trial court below had engaged in such analysis."' In addition,
the Lyons court said, the Skaggs court mentioned Conlding only because that was
the case on which the plaintiffs were relying."' Furthermore, the Lyons court said,
the facts of Con/ding involved a use of privileged matters that would have triggered
waiver under even the most restrictive approach. '2Instead, the Lyons court found
a preference for the Rhone-Poulenc approach in Skaggs' use of the language from
the Restatement (Third)of the Law Governing Lawyers and in Skaggs' reference to
waiver requiring "offensive use" of privileged materials.'
The Lyons court also considered Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co."' and
quickly distinguished the case as confined to waiver through inadvertent
disclosure.' 23 "[O]ur Supreme Court in Hartman did not specifically or expressly
address the issue" of at-issue waiver, the Lyons court found in concluding that
"Hartman does not support adoption of the Hearn approach."' 24 The Lyons court

108. Id.
109. See id
110. See id at 495, 10 P.3d at 174 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
111.Id.
112. See Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. Lyons, 129 N.M. 487, 495-96, 10 P.3d 166, 174-75 (CL App.

2000).
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

125 N.M. 97, 957 P.2d 526 (1998).
Lyons, 129 N.M. at 495, 10 P.3d at 174.
Conkling v. Turner, 883 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1989).
Heam v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
Lyons, 129 N.M. at 495, 10 P.3d at 174.
Id
Id
Id. at 495-96, 10 P.3d at 174-75.
Id. at496, 10P.3dat 175. See also supranotes 86, 89.
107 N.M. 679,763 P.2d 1144 (1988).
Lyons, 129 N.M. at 496, 10 P.3d at 175.
Id.
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limited its holding to at-issue waiver theory and did not address claims unique to
work-product protection.125'
B. Apples and Oranges
The Lyons court asked itself in light of FirstJudicial,2 6 "If we are rule-bound
concerning the recognition of specific privileges and waiver, should our courts
engage in the type of ad hoc judicial waiver analysis engaged in by other courts that
are free to apply the common law? '1 27 In answering "no," the court may have mixed
apples and oranges and narrowed its analysis unnecessarily.
Whether one has waived a privilege is not the same question as whether one may
create a privilege. New Mexico clearly is rule-bound concerning the latter, but the
waiver analysis may more properly be viewed as construction of an existing rule.
The New Mexico rules, after all, already specifically provide for waiver through
29
disclosure. 28 What they do not do is define disclosure.
Applying New Mexico's rule-bound privilege-recognition approach to the
question of whether one has waived an already-recognized privilege is thus a non
sequitur. Adopting a narrow definition of at-issue waiver is neither consistent nor
inconsistent with New Mexico's unique approach to rule-making. They are different
inquiries.
V. IMPLICATIONS
A. Stating a Rule Benefits All
In light of the ambiguity of Skaggs, the Lyons court may have benefited
practitioners most by stating clearly a rule for at-issue waiver in New Mexico. For
as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, "[ain uncertain privilege... is
little better than no privilege at all."' 3 Attorneys and their clients may now more
confidently assess whether the attorney-client privilege remains intact.
B. Privilege as a Weapon
The Lyons rule might so strongly protect the attorney-client privilege that it
encourages parties to use the privilege as a weapon. After all, if a privileged
of
communication cannot be introduced, "a client could present the
131 justification
legal advice in an inaccurate, incomplete, and self-serving way."

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 496-97, 10 P.3d at 175-76.
State ex rel.Attorney Gen. v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330 (1981).
Lyons, 129 N.M. at 491-92, 10 P.3d at 170-71.
SeeN.M.R. EVID. 11-511.
Id.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 49 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).

131.

RESTATEmENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 130 cmt. b. (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,

1996). See also Heam v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 582 (1975) (When attorney-client communications inhere in the
allow assertion of the privilege... would pervert its essential purpose and transform it into
controversy itself, "[t]o
a potential tool for concealment."); T. Maxfield Bahner & Michael L Gallion, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
via Issue Injection: A Callfor Uniformity, 65 DEF. CouNs. J. 199, 205 (1998) (The "rigid approach" of the RhonePoulenc test adopted by the Lyons court "can actually facilitate abuse of the privilege.")
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The Lyons rule might thus have created a virtual immunity from a statute of
limitations defense. Claims such as equitable tolling that attempt to overcome a
statute of limitations defense do not necessarily involve reliance on counsel's
advice, but reliance on counsel often underlies such claims.' 32 Now, with the
attorney-client privilege preserved under Lyons, plaintiffs who plead equitable
tolling may say they failed to discover the basis for their claim while declining to
reveal just how they failed to do so.' So long as they do not affirmatively rely on
attorney-client communication, that information remains secret.t3"
Similarly, a fraud defendant might argue that her actions were based on a goodfaith belief that she was complying with the law. This defense, like an equitable
tolling claim, often involves an underlying reliance on counsel's advice. 35 Yet, after
Lyons, this defendant
may avoid the waiver problem by failing to explain the source
36
of her belief.
As one court summarized the problem, a plaintiff should not be permitted "to
thrust his lack of knowledge into the litigation as a foundation or condition
necessary to sustain his claim... while simultaneously retaining the lawyer-client
privilege to frustrate proof of knowledge ....
Such tactic or situation would repudiate
the sword-shield maxim. " '37
The Lyons court argues that its holding will have the opposite effect:
The restrictive approach we adopt is consistent with the long-held view that the
attorney-client privilege should act as a shield and not a sword. Confusion in the
"at-issue" case law arises because some courts believe that parties are using a
privilege as a sword when they refuse to disclose matters relevant to issues or
claims that they have injected into the litigation. This belief explains why the
Hearn ad hoc balancing test has resulted in an expansive use of waiver. By
adopting the Rhone approach requiring offensive or direct use of privileged
information, we believe the 'shield/sword' metaphor is more accurately
applied. 3

132. See Bahner & Gallion, supra note 131, at 205.
133. See generally id at 205-06 ("[lfthe privilege is applied, the parties asserting the claim or defense could
preclude access to communications central to their mental state. Because a client's mental state often results from
counsel's advice, shielding these communications can work an equal injustice in some cases.").
134. The court's rule, then, allows a party to avoid waiver by pleading very carefully. The rule thus permits
a critical issue to turn on the "art" of pleading, a concept shunned in modem pleading. The federal and state rules
of civil procedure "reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be
decisive to the outcome; the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits." Hambaugh v.
Peoples, 75 N.M. 144,153,401 P.2d 777, 782 (1965) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)). Yet the
Lyons rule might prove to be a trap for the unwary litigant who pleads too much.
135. Bahner & Gallion, supra note 131, at 205.
136. Such a situation arose in aHearnjurisdiction in United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 199 1).
There, a fraud defendant contended his testimony regarding his good-faith attempt to comply with the law would
not have disclosed the content or even the existence of privileged communications with counsel. Id. at 1291. In
finding at-issue waiver, the court said such testimony would necessarily have put the basis for his understanding
of the law at issue, and that his conversations with counsel regarding the legality of his behavior would have been
directly relevant in determining the extent of his knowledge. See id. at 1292.
137. League v. Vanice, 374 N.W.2d 849, 856 (Neb. 1985).
138. Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. Lyons, 129 N.M. 487,495, 10 P.3d 166, 174 (Ct. App. 2000) (internal
citation omitted).
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The court does not say how the metaphor is more accurately applied, but rather goes
39
on to discuss again the purpose of the attorney-client privilege.
Indeed, how the metaphor may thus be more accurately applied is unclear.
Suppose, as in the statute of limitations example, the plaintiff pleads equitable
tolling and declines to reveal how he failed to discover the basis for his claim. The
defendant might now, through interrogatory, ask how the plaintiff failed to discover
the basis for his claim. Presumably, the plaintiff may decline to answer the
interrogatory, citing the attorney-client privilege. The defendant has hit a dead end.
The Rhone-Poulenc approach has not given the plaintiff a metaphorical shield, as
suggested by Lyons, nor is one needed, because the Rhone-Poulenc approach has
deprived the defendant of a sword.
C. Flaws in the Alternative
Had the Lyons court ruled otherwise, it might have opened a door that could not
be closed. Were the Hearn balancing test adopted, the privilege could be waived
anytime a party's knowledge or understanding was an important element of a claim
or defense and a privileged communication was possibly vital or relevant to that
knowledge. Privileged communications could be made subject to discovery in
negligence cases where the state of the defendant's expertise is in question; in
contract cases where a party's understanding of the contract is at issue; in fraud
cases where the plaintiff's reliance on the fraud is at issue; in criminal cases where
the defendant's intent, or even the truth of her defense, is critical. The Hearn
exceptions, therefore, could swallow the privilege, and a privilege that "purports to
be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts[] is little better
than no privilege at all.""
VI. CONCLUSION
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139. See id.
140. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383.393 (1981).

